| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| mobsf | < 3.9.7 | 3.9.7 |
| mobsfscan | < 0.3.8 | 0.3.8 |
| mobile security framework | < 3.9.7 | 3.9.7 |
While examining the "App Link assetlinks.json file could not be found" vulnerability detected by MobSF, we, as the Trendyol Application Security team, noticed that a GET request was sent to the "/.well-known/assetlinks.json" endpoint for all hosts written with "android:host". In the AndroidManifest.xml file.
Since MobSF does not perform any input validation when extracting the hostnames in "android:host", requests can also be sent to local hostnames. This may cause SSRF vulnerability.
Example <intent-filter structure in AndroidManifest.xml:
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="true">
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:host="192.168.1.102/user/delete/1#" android:scheme="http" />
</intent-filter>
We defined it as android:host="192.168.1.102/user/delete/1#". Here, the "#" character at the end of the host prevents requests from being sent to the "/.well-known/assetlinks.json" endpoint and ensures that requests are sent to the endpoint before it.
<img width="617" alt="image" src="https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/assets/150332295/c570cb00-e947-4ad7-af80-26d46c0ad3f7">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nbKMd2sKosbJef5Mh4DxjcHcQ8Hw0BNR/view?usp=share_link
The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure.
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