| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/tektoncd/pipeline | ≥ 0.43.0, < 1.0.2≥ 1.1.0, < 1.3.4≥ 1.10.0, < 1.11.1≥ 1.2.0, < 1.3.4≥ 1.4.0, < 1.6.2≥ 1.7.0, < 1.9.3 | 1.0.21.3.41.11.11.6.21.9.3 |
| tekton pipelines | ≥ 0.43.0, < 1.11.0 | 1.11.0 |
hey guys,
triage contract this is a first-screen summary; deterministic proof is in the proof bundle (canonical.log/control.log/witness.txt).
summary
trusted resources verification policies match a resource source string (refSource.URI) against spec.resources[].pattern using regexp.MatchString. in go, regexp.MatchString reports a match if the pattern matches anywhere in the string, so common unanchored patterns (including examples in tekton documentation) can be bypassed by attacker-controlled source strings that contain the trusted pattern as a substring. this can cause an unintended policy match and change which verification mode/keys apply.
pins
severity MEDIUM (provisional CVSS 5.3–6.5) (signing request tampering)
repro (canonical)
negative control
fix
consider making matching safe-by-default by requiring full-string matches (or validating patterns and documenting substring semantics clearly). one option is to anchor patterns before matching (e.g., wrap pattern as ^(?:pattern)$ when not already anchored), or to provide a separate field for exact match vs regex match.
fix accepted when: under the same harness, canonical still hits [CALLSITE_HIT] but does not emit [PROOF_MARKER].
proof bundle pointers
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phíimpact
an attacker can craft a trusted resources source string that embeds a trusted substring and still matches an unanchored verificationpolicy spec.resources[].pattern, even if the policy is intended to constrain matches to a specific trusted source. this occurs because regexp.MatchString succeeds on substring matches, so patterns like https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git match attacker-controlled sources such as https://evil.com/?x=https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git.
affected: deployments using trusted resources verification with unanchored verificationpolicy patterns, where an attacker can influence the refSource.URI value used for policy matching.
not affected: deployments that anchor all patterns (^...$) or otherwise enforce full-string matching; deployments where attackers cannot influence refSource.URI.
steps to reproduce
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001
cd /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001
bash ./run.sh canonical | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log
bash ./run.sh control | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log
grep -n '\\[PROOF_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log && grep -n '\\[NC_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log && ! grep -n '\\[PROOF_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log
suggested patch options:
workarounds anchor verificationpolicy resource patterns so they must match the full source string. example:
^https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog\\.git$best, oleh