Summary
Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as lanHost, tailnetDns, gatewayPort, and gatewayTlsSha256. TXT records are unauthenticated.
Prior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:
- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (
lanHost/tailnetDns) and ports (gatewayPort) to build the connection URL.
- iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (
gatewayTlsSha256) to override a previously stored TLS pin.
On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue _openclaw-gw._tcp service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (auth.token / auth.password) during connection.
Distribution / Exposure
The iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.
CVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm)
- Affected:
<= 2026.2.13 (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)
- Patched: planned for
>= 2026.2.14 (not yet published at time of writing)
Fix
- Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.
- Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.
- iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).
- iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.
- Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).
Fix Commit(s)
- d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586
Credits
Thanks @simecek for reporting.
Mô tả của NVD
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. In Android, hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).