| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kyverno/kyverno | < 1.17.0 | 1.17.0 |
| kyverno | < 1.16.4 | 1.16.4 |
kyverno’s apiCall servicecall helper implicitly injects Authorization: Bearer ... using the kyverno controller serviceaccount token when a policy does not explicitly set an Authorization header. because context.apiCall.service.url is policy-controlled, this can send the kyverno serviceaccount token to an attacker-controlled endpoint (confused deputy).
namespaced policies are blocked from servicecall usage by the namespaced urlPath gate in pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go, so this report is scoped to ClusterPolicy and global context usage.
the attacker can create or update a ClusterPolicy (or create a GlobalContextEntry) which uses context.apiCall.service.url and can choose the request URL and headers. a cross-boundary framing for real deployments is gitops: if the policy repo/controller is compromised, the ClusterPolicy/global context entry becomes untrusted input to kyverno.
in (*executor).addHTTPHeaders, kyverno reads the serviceaccount token from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token and injects it when the outgoing request has no Authorization header:
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}
the attached poc.zip is a reproducible cluster PoC. it uses an in-cluster HTTP receiver which logs the Authorization header it receives. the PoC does not print token bytes; it only checks that the received header is non-empty and not equal to the negative control.
run (one command):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make test
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Quét site miễn phícanonical (expected: implicit token injection):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical
expected output includes:
[CALLSITE_HIT]: executor.addHTTPHeaders Authorization=="" -> read_serviceaccount_token=true
[PROOF_MARKER]: authorization_header_injected=true token_nonempty=true
control (expected: explicit Authorization header disables auto-injection):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control
expected output includes:
[CALLSITE_HIT]: executor.addHTTPHeaders Authorization!="" -> autoinject_skipped=true
[NC_MARKER]: authorization_header_injected=false
optional: the canonical run may also print an [RBAC]: ... line using kubectl auth can-i with the exfiltrated token, to show concrete privileges without exposing the token.
token exfiltration: the kyverno controller serviceaccount token is sent to a policy-controlled endpoint. impact depends on the rbac bound to that serviceaccount in the target deployment.
do not auto-inject the kyverno serviceaccount token into policy-controlled servicecall requests. require explicit Authorization configuration, or enforce a strict allowlist of destinations where credentials may be attached and document the behavior.
oleh