OpenClaw's gateway config mutation guard allowed unsafe model-driven config writes

Summary

The agent-facing gateway tool protects config.apply and config.patch with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.

Impact

A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only gateway tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw on npm
• Affected: versions before 2026.4.23
• Fixed: 2026.4.23
• Latest stable verified fixed: [email protected], tag v2026.4.23

Fix

OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven gateway config.apply and gateway config.patch now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.

Fix Commit(s)

• bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec (fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits)

Severity

Severity remains high. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.