| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai-platform | < 0.1.4 | 0.1.4 |
Type: Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members endpoint is gated only by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) (default min_role="member") and forwards the request body's user_id and role straight into MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role), which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace.
File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101; services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
Root cause: MemberService.add validates only that role is in VALID_ROLES = {"owner", "admin", "member"} — the value, not the caller's right to assign it. The route's Depends(require_workspace_member) resolves to the default min_role="member". So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that would otherwise gate them.
File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101.
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role) # <-- writes any (user, role)
return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)
File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
async def add(
self,
workspace_id: str,
user_id: str,
role: str = "member",
) -> Member:
"""Add a user to a workspace."""
if role not in VALID_ROLES: # only validates the value
raise ValueError(f"Invalid role: {role}. Must be one of {VALID_ROLES}")
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
self._session.add(member) # <-- BUG: no caller-permission check
await self._session.flush()
return member
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Quét site miễn phíWhy it's wrong: workspace member management is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. The role hierarchy is implemented (MemberService.has_role, member_service.py:80-96), the dependency-tunable min_role parameter exists (require_workspace_member(min_role), deps.py:58), but the POST .../members route uses neither. The VALID_ROLES enum check is purely cosmetic — it accepts "owner" from any caller because the route never asked whether the caller has the right to assign that role.
W). Account A is an existing member of W; Account B is a fresh signup the attacker controls (any account on the platform — auth/register is open by default). State: attacker holds tokens for both A and B.Authorization: Bearer <A_jwt> to POST /workspaces/W/members with body {"user_id": "<B_user_id>", "role": "owner"}. State: control flow enters add_member.require_workspace_member(W, A) passes (A is a member). MemberService.add(W, B, "owner") writes a new row Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=B, role="owner"). State: Account B is now a workspace-W owner.Severity: sec-critical. CVSS 9.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (member tier), no user interaction, scope changed (the new owner is a different security principal), high confidentiality and integrity, no availability claim.
Attacker capability: with one workspace-member token plus one POST request, the attacker grants owner-tier access to any user_id on the platform. From there, full workspace control via the Account B token, plus indirect attribution: the original workspace's audit logs see "user A added user B as owner" but the audit trail cannot tell that B is attacker-controlled.
Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token in the target workspace; the attacker can register or knows any other user_id on the platform.
Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between MemberService.has_role (clearly tiered) and add_member's default min_role="member" confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the gate refuses the member-tier token, the elevated POST returns 403, and the second-identity owner is never created.
--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
@@ -90,11 +90,15 @@
+def _require_workspace_owner(workspace_id: str, user, session):
+ return require_workspace_member(workspace_id, user, session, min_role="owner")
+
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
+ if body.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, "owner"):
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Only owners can add other owners")
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)
The four other workspace mutation endpoints (update_workspace, delete_workspace, update_member_role, remove_member) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.