Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

Summary

Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:

POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}

Confirmed reachable targets:

• auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.
• arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys.
• /proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets.
• Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
• SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...') reaches instance metadata IPs.

Patches

Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:

1. SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
2. SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
3. Verified by reading back the flag.

After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.

Workarounds

• Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
• Temporary mitigation: add read_csv*/read_json*/glob etc. to dangerousSQLPattern in pending 2026.06.1.