| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| shopware/core | ≥ 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1 | 6.7.10.1 |
| shopware/platform | ≥ 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1 | 6.7.10.1 |
The /api/_action/media/external-link endpoint allows authenticated admin users to make server-side HTTP HEAD requests to arbitrary internal IP addresses. While the parallel uploadFromURL flow validates target IPs against private/reserved ranges via FileUrlValidator, the linkURL flow only performs a URL format check (regex for http:// or https:// prefix), allowing SSRF to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.
The vulnerability is an inconsistency between two URL-handling flows in MediaUploadService.
Vulnerable path (external-link):
MediaUploadV2Controller::externalLink() at src/Core/Content/Media/Api/MediaUploadV2Controller.php:66 takes a user-supplied url parameter and passes it to MediaUploadService::linkURL() at src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:134.
linkURL() calls getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl($url) at line 159, which only validates via validateExternalUrl():
// src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:207-212
public static function validateExternalUrl(string $url): void
{
if (!preg_match('/^https?:\/\/.+/', $url)) {
throw MediaException::invalidUrl($url);
}
}
Then makes a server-side HEAD request with no IP filtering:
// src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:292-300
private function getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl(string $url): int
{
$this->validateExternalUrl($url);
$headers = $this->httpClient->request('HEAD', $url)->getHeaders();
if (!\array_key_exists('content-length', $headers)) {
throw MediaException::fileNotFound($url);
}
return (int) $headers['content-length'][0];
}
Protected path (upload_by_url):
In contrast, uploadFromURL uses FileFetcher::fetchFromURL() which calls FileUrlValidator::isValid():
// src/Core/Content/Media/File/FileFetcher.php:64
if ($this->enableUrlValidation && !$this->fileUrlValidator->isValid($url)) {
throw MediaException::illegalUrl($url);
}
FileUrlValidator::isValid() resolves the hostname via gethostbyname() and validates the IP against private and reserved ranges using with . This protection is entirely absent from the flow.
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phífilter_var()FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGElinkURLAn authenticated admin user can:
169.254.169.254 reveal whether cloud metadata endpoints exist and leak content-length valuesfileSize field stored in the database reflects the content-length header from internal servicesImpact is limited to information disclosure via HEAD requests. The admin authentication requirement (PR:H) reduces exploitability, but in multi-tenant or compromised-credential scenarios this allows network reconnaissance from the server's perspective.
Apply FileUrlValidator to the linkURL flow, consistent with the uploadFromURL flow. In MediaUploadService:
// src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php
// Add constructor dependency:
private readonly FileUrlValidatorInterface $fileUrlValidator;
// In getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl(), add IP validation:
private function getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl(string $url): int
{
$this->validateExternalUrl($url);
if (!$this->fileUrlValidator->isValid($url)) {
throw MediaException::illegalUrl($url);
}
$headers = $this->httpClient->request('HEAD', $url)->getHeaders();
if (!\array_key_exists('content-length', $headers)) {
throw MediaException::fileNotFound($url);
}
return (int) $headers['content-length'][0];
}
Additionally, consider setting max_redirects: 0 on the HttpClient request to prevent redirect-based SSRF bypasses.