| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/server | < 3.39.0 | 3.39.0 |
The webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema.
The route appears to be builder-only:
packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts:5-95:builderRoutes
6: .get("/api/webhooks", controller.fetch)
7: .put("/api/webhooks", webhookValidator(), controller.save)
8: .delete("/api/webhooks/:id/:rev", controller.destroy)
9: .post("/api/webhooks/schema/:instance/:id", controller.buildSchema)
However, webhook endpoint detection explicitly includes schema:
packages/server/src/middleware/utils.ts:3-93:const WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS = new RegExp(
4: "^/api/webhooks/(trigger|schema|discord|ms-teams|slack)(/|$)"
5:)
6:
7:export function isWebhookEndpoint(ctx: UserCtx): boolean {
8: const path = ctx.path || ctx.request.url.split("?")[0]
9: return WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS.test(path)
The authorization middleware bypasses all webhook endpoints before checking ctx.user or permissions:
packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:90-9990: ) =>
91: async (ctx: UserCtx, next: any) => {
92: // webhooks don't need authentication, each webhook unique
93: // also internal requests (between services) don't need authorized
94: if (isWebhookEndpoint(ctx) || ctx.internal) {
95: return next()
96: }
97:
98: if (!ctx.user) {
99: return ctx.throw(401, "No user info found")
The bypassed controller writes attacker-derived schema data to the webhook and automation trigger outputs:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook.ts:56-8356:export async function buildSchema(
57: ctx: Ctx<BuildWebhookSchemaRequest, BuildWebhookSchemaResponse>
58:) {
59: await context.doInWorkspaceContext(ctx.params.instance, async () => {
60: const db = context.getWorkspaceDB()
61: const webhook = await db.get<Webhook>(ctx.params.id)
62: webhook.bodySchema = toJsonSchema(ctx.request.body)
63: // update the automation outputs
64: if (webhook.action.type === WebhookActionType.AUTOMATION) {
65: let automation = await db.get<Automation>(webhook.action.target)
66: const autoOutputs = automation.definition.trigger.schema.outputs
67: let properties = webhook.bodySchema?.properties
68: // reset webhook outputs
69: autoOutputs.properties = {
70: body: autoOutputs.properties.body,
71: }
72: for (let prop of Object.keys(properties || {})) {
73: if (properties?.[prop] == null) {
74: continue
75: }
76: const def = properties[prop]
77: if (typeof def === "boolean") {
78: continue
79: }
80: autoOutputs.properties[prop] = {
81: type: def.type as AutomationIOType,
82: description: AUTOMATION_DESCRIPTION,
83: }
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phíThe route grouping suggests builder authorization was intended, but the global webhook bypass removes it.
Non-destructive validation approach:
POST /api/webhooks/schema/<workspaceId>/<webhookId> HTTP/1.1
content-type: application/json
{"unauth_schema_probe":"test"}
bodySchema has changed.An unauthenticated attacker can modify webhook schema metadata and automation trigger output schema for known webhook IDs. This can corrupt builder-visible automation definitions, alter downstream binding behavior, and disrupt webhook-backed automation workflows.