| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogs | < 0.14.3mọi phiên bản | 0.14.3 |
In Gogs 0.14.1, GET /attachments/:uuid returns the raw attachment file without verifying whether the requester has view permission for the associated Issue/Comment/Release or the repository.
In a test environment with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false, we confirmed that an unauthenticated user can download attachments belonging to a private repository.
/attachments/:uuid retrieves an attachment record solely by the UUID provided in the URL and returns the corresponding local file without performing any authorization checks against the attachment’s parent object (Issue/Comment/Release) or the repository it belongs to. As a result, even attachments under private repositories can be downloaded by an unauthenticated user (or a user without proper permissions) as long as the UUID is known.
Relevant code (internal/cmd/web.go:306):
m.Get("/attachments/:uuid", func(c *context.Context) {
attach, err := database.GetAttachmentByUUID(c.Params(":uuid"))
if err != nil {
c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get attachment by UUID")
return
} else if !com.IsFile(attach.LocalPath()) {
c.NotFound()
return
}
fr, err := os.Open(attach.LocalPath())
if err != nil {
c.Error(err, "open attachment file")
return
}
defer fr.Close()
c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
c.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public,max-age=86400")
c.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`inline; filename="%s"`, attach.Name))
if _, err = io.Copy(c.Resp, fr); err != nil {
c.Error(err, "copy from file to response")
return
}
})
The UUID lookup itself also performs no validation tied to repository visibility or user permissions. Authorization is not enforced at this layer.
Relevant code (internal/database/attachment.go:124):
// GetAttachmentByUUID returns attachment by given UUID.
func GetAttachmentByUUID(uuid string) (*Attachment, error) {
return getAttachmentByUUID(x, uuid)
}
[auth] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false.REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true, exploitation may still be possible because the handler does not check repository-level permissions; a user who can log in but lacks access to the target repository may still retrieve the attachment.Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phímyadmin/idor-attach-1770724346-1a13bbf06d90f8-5b62-4c10-ac8d-f11fdf870b57).The repository page → 404 Not Found
<img width="1702" height="758" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8fdb1d92-cfc3-4ef8-977e-60ec13f792df" />The Issue page under that repository → 404 Not Found
<img width="1983" height="546" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c44c5e69-8ca2-4ea6-a071-62302b7e896f" />GET /attachments/<uuid> → the attachment file is successfully downloaded
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false: none (works without authentication).REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true: only the ability to log in (repository view permission is not required in practice).Confidential information attached to private repositories or restricted Issues/Releases may be disclosed.
While the severity depends on the attachment contents, attachments frequently contain sensitive data, making the potential impact high.