| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| openclaw | < 2026.5.22 | 2026.5.22 |
| openclaw | < 2026.5.22 | 2026.5.22 |
In affected LAN/shared-token Control UI deployments, a caller could spoof locality information used during Control UI pairing and obtain a durable admin-capable device token.
This issue is limited to deployments where the caller already has the network/authentication foothold needed to reach the Control UI pairing path. It is not an unauthenticated internet exposure issue.
This affects configurations such as LAN-bound gateways or shared-token Control UI access where locality signals were accepted as sufficient for pairing decisions.
A temporary or shared Control UI access path could be turned into a persistent admin device token. That token could remain useful after the shared gateway token was rotated, unless the paired device was removed.
The issue is a pairing/locality validation problem: locality-derived trust was stronger than it should have been.
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.22.
Upgrade to [email protected] or later. For older deployments, remove unexpected paired devices and avoid exposing Control UI pairing paths on networks with untrusted clients.
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