| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| nltk | < 3.10.0 | 3.10.0 |
| nltk | < 3.10.0 | 3.10.0 |
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py
that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always
False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a
file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point
with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check
doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared
against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are
always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing
self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running
normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of
what path was passed in.
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])
Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or
nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant
pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:
/etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
Line 387 compares against itself — always equal, so the never fires. The check is dead code. already calls on construction, so re-running inside changes nothing either.
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phínormpath(self._path)ValueError__init__abspath()normpathopen()Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream
commonpath not startswithstartswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")