| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/server | ≤ 3.38.1 |
Budibase 3.39.19 (commit 03fbabae4) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An app-scoped builder (a user who builds only specific apps — user.builder.apps = [appA], not a global builder or admin) can grant themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. ADMIN) in any app, by calling POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign. The endpoint only authorizes the two global flags (admin, builder); the per-app appBuilder and role:{appId,roleId} grant vectors are passed to the backend without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.
This is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit d63d1d9054 ("Inline public user global role validation"), which only ever validated the global flags.
The issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a flag-level allowlist (admin/builder) instead of validating the scope the caller is granting.
Relevant code paths:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts — validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate) only checks roleUpdate.admin (requires isAdmin) and roleUpdate.builder (requires isGlobalBuilder). The GlobalRoleUpdate interface declares only { builder?, admin? }; appBuilder and role are not referenced.packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts — assign() does const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps). The appBuilder/role props pass through unvalidated.packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts — assign(): for opts.appBuilder it sets user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }; for opts.role it sets user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId. No check that the caller builds the target app, and is an arbitrary list (). The only gate is the license check.Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phíuserIdsbulkGetisExpandedPublicApiEnabled()packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.ts — applyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints) attaches only middleware.builderOrAdmin (no publicApi, no authorized(PermissionType.USER, …)).packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts — with a workspaceId present, it only requires isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId). The attacker sets x-budibase-app-id to their own app (appA), so the gate passes.packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts — on the worker, POST /api/global/self/api_key only requires hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user), which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.ts — isGlobalBuilder is false for app-scoped builders (so the global builder flag is correctly blocked), while isBuilder(user, appA) and hasBuilderPermissions(user) are true.Attack flow:
appA only (no global builder/admin).POST /api/global/self/api_key (worker) — passes builderOnly via hasBuilderPermissions → attacker obtains a public API key.POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign with header x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id> and body {"userIds":["<self>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}} — builderOrAdmin passes (isBuilder(user, appA)), validateGlobalRoleUpdate ignores appBuilder, the SDK pushes appB into user.builder.apps.appB (and, via the role vector, can set any data-role such as ADMIN in any app).Security boundary crossed:
appA only.appB (and any other app) → read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the bash/executeScript/executeQuery steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.Environment:
3.39.19, commit 03fbabae4isExpandedPublicApiEnabled)user.builder.apps=[appA]), not global builder/adminSteps (unit-level proof, no license needed — verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):
cd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab
node harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs
evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log):[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B} -> NOT rejected
[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:'ADMIN'}-> NOT rejected
[BLOCKED 403] builder:true (global) -> Only global builders or admins ...
[BLOCKED 403] admin:true (global) -> Only global admins ...
after : builder={"apps":["app_A...","app_B..."]} roles={"app_B...":"ADMIN"}
isBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true <-- escalated to builder of APP_B
Steps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab — poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh):
# 1) self-issue API key
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H "Cookie: <attacker session>" -d '{}'
# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \
-H "x-budibase-api-key: <KEY>" -H "x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id>" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"userIds":["<self global id>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}'
The request should be rejected (403) — an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant
itself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the
grant is applied.
Evidence files:
evidence/lab-privesc-authz.logpoc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs, poc/privesc-roles-assign.shRuntime limitation: full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (isExpandedPublicApiEnabled); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route→validation→SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.
An attacker holding an app-scoped builder role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:
ADMIN) in any app to any user, including themselves.It does not grant the global admin/builder flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.