| Gói / sản phẩm | Phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng | Phiên bản đã vá |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311 | 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311 |
GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 added a centralized guard,
util.IsForbiddenAbsPath(), specifically to block access to a small
set of sensitive files: conf/conf.json (plaintext
accessAuthCode/API token/cookie key), data/snippets/conf.json,
the entire data/templates/ directory, and
data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json (plaintext publish-mode passwords).
It was applied to kernel/api/file.go and kernel/mcp/tools/file.go.
Two other routes in the same server that serve arbitrary files by path,
/history/*path and /repo/diff/*path, construct their target paths
independently and were not updated to call this new guard. Since the
repo/history snapshot system's tracked root is data/ (confirmed by
getSyncIgnoreLines(), whose ignore file lives at
data/.siyuan/syncignore with entries relative to data/), both
data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/* fall within
the scope that can legitimately be captured in historical snapshots,
meaning a prior version of either file can exist in
util.HistoryDir/the repo-diff temp checkout even after the live file
has been protected by the new guard. This is CWE-862 (Missing
Authorization) applied to a very recently introduced protection
mechanism.
kernel/server/serve.go, /history/*path (around line 994):
ginServer.GET("/history/*path", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, func(context *gin.Context) {
p := filepath.Join(util.HistoryDir, context.Param("path"))
// 加密笔记本的历史是密文（.sy/assets/AV），需先解密再输出
if serveEncryptedHistory(context, p) {
return
}
secureAssetContentHeaders(context, p, p)
http.ServeFile(context.Writer, context.Request, p)
})
No call to util.IsForbiddenAbsPath(p) anywhere in this handler.
kernel/server/serve.go, /repo/diff/*path (around line 1241):
ginServer.GET("/repo/diff/*path", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, func(context *gin.Context) {
requestPath := filepath.Clean(context.Param("path"))
if strings.Contains(requestPath, "..") {
context.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
...
p := filepath.Join(repoDiffBaseDir, requestPath)
if !gulu.File.IsSubPath(repoDiffBaseDir, p) {
context.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
http.ServeFile(context.Writer, context.Request, p)
})
Bạn đang dùng một trong các sản phẩm này? Quét site để biết có đang lộ phiên bản có lỗ hổng không.
Quét site miễn phíThis route does have its own traversal protection (.. rejection and
IsSubPath containment within repoDiffBaseDir), but that only
prevents escaping the diff-checkout directory, it does nothing to
prevent retrieving a legitimately checked-out historical copy of
publishAccess.json or a templates file from within that directory,
which is exactly what the new guard exists to prevent regardless of
which directory the copy currently sits in.
util.IsForbiddenAbsPath() itself (kernel/util/path_guard.go,
introduced by the referenced fix) confirms the intended scope:
// 禁止访问 data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json（含发布模式明文访问密码）
publishAccessPath := NormalizeAndResolve(filepath.Join(DataDir, ".siyuan", "publishAccess.json"))
if fileNorm == publishAccessPath {
return true
}
and
// 禁止访问 data/templates 目录（含目录本身及其全部子路径）
templatesBase := NormalizeAndResolve(filepath.Join(DataDir, "templates"))
if fileNorm == templatesBase || gulu.File.IsSubPath(templatesBase, fileNorm) {
return true
}
Both are paths within data/, the same root the sync/history/repo
system tracks.
data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json with a
plaintext password), then let a sync/backup snapshot capture this
state (or check whether local history capture already covers
data/.siyuan/ in the deployed version).publishAccess.json no longer contains the old plaintext password
the new guard is meant to hide, going forward.curl -s http://<target>:6806/history/<snapshot-path-to-publishAccess.json> \
-u "<workspaceName>:<accessAuthCode>"
curl -s http://<target>:6806/repo/diff/<diff-path-to-publishAccess.json> \
-u "<workspaceName>:<accessAuthCode>"
IsForbiddenAbsPath, so the
historical copy is served if it exists in that location.(Not run against a live compiled kernel, same sandbox limitation noted
throughout this review; both handlers are read directly from source at
the reviewed commit, and IsForbiddenAbsPath's scope, plus the
sync-root confirmation via getSyncIgnoreLines(), are quoted directly
above. Whether these specific files are captured by history/repo
snapshots in a given deployment depends on the workspace's actual
usage history and was not independently verified against a live
instance in this review.)
An admin-authenticated request to either route can potentially retrieve
a historical copy of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json (disclosing a
plaintext publish-mode password even after it has been changed or the
live file has been protected) or a data/templates/* file, directly
undermining the protection GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 was written four days
prior to this review specifically to provide, via two routes that
predate that fix and were not updated alongside it.
## Affected products
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | **Go** |
| Package name | `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` |
| Affected versions | Present as of commit `251596f` (2026-08-12, the version this review confirmed), i.e. postdates and was not covered by the `GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34` fix (commit `3542530`, 2026-08-08) |
| Patched versions | *(none yet, leave blank until a fix is released)* |
## Severity
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vector string | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:M/I:N/A:N` |
| Score | **~5.9 (Medium)**, `PR:H` since admin authentication is required at the HTTP layer, confidentiality impact scoped to whatever sensitive historical content happens to exist in the tracked snapshots for a given deployment (a real but deployment-dependent condition, honestly reflected as Medium rather than assumed to always be present), no integrity/availability impact since both are read-only. |
## Weaknesses (CWE)
- **CWE-862**: Missing Authorization (primary)
- **CWE-200**: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
## Notes for filing
- Direct, narrow follow-up to `GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34`; recommend
referencing that advisory directly when filing, since this is
precisely the "sibling caller missed" pattern that fix's own
centralization (moving the check into a shared `util` function) was
presumably intended to prevent, just for two callers that existed
before the shared function did and weren't migrated to it.
- Suggested fix: add `if util.IsForbiddenAbsPath(p) { ... reject ... }`
to both handlers, matching the pattern already applied in
`kernel/api/file.go` and `kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`.