TsDProxy: X-Forwarded-For header injection allows IP spoofing in proxied requests to backend services

Description

The HTTP reverse proxy handler in tsdproxy does not strip the X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) header from incoming requests before calling r.SetXForwarded(). This allows an authenticated Tailscale user to inject arbitrary X-Forwarded-For values that are forwarded verbatim to backend services.

// internal/proxymanager/port.go -- Rewrite function
Rewrite: func(r *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
    r.SetURL(pconfig.GetFirstTarget())
    r.Out.Host = r.In.Host

    // Strips tsdproxy identity headers (correct)
    r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderID)
    r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderRemoteUser)
    r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderXForwardedUser)
    // ... other identity headers deleted ...

    // X-Forwarded-For is NOT deleted before SetXForwarded!
    // X-Real-IP is NOT deleted at all!
    r.SetXForwarded()  // APPENDS client IP to attacker-controlled XFF list
},

Per Go's httputil.ProxyRequest.SetXForwarded() documentation:

If the inbound request has an existing X-Forwarded-For header, SetXForwarded appends the inbound request's remote address to the list.

Result when attacker sends X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1:

• Backend receives: X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1, <real-tailscale-client-ip>
• If backend reads first element as "original client", attacker appears as 127.0.0.1

X-Real-IP is not handled at all -- if the attacker sets X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1, it is forwarded to the backend verbatim without any overriding or stripping.

Many backend applications trust the first element of X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) for:

• IP-based access control (admin panels restricted to 127.0.0.1)
• Rate limiting tied to source IP
• Audit logging
• Geo-blocking or network-segment restrictions

This is particularly impactful in tsdproxy's intended use case where the backend service is only accessible through tsdproxy -- making the proxy's header handling the sole enforcement point.

CVSS

CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N = 7.7

Severity

High

Affected Code / Files

• internal/proxymanager/port.go -- newPortProxy Rewrite closure
• Missing: r.Out.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-For") before r.SetXForwarded()
• Missing: r.Out.Header.Del("X-Real-IP") unconditional strip

Steps to Reproduce

1. Deploy tsdproxy with a backend service that restricts /admin to 127.0.0.1 via X-Forwarded-For (e.g., Nginx with real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For and real_ip_recursive on)
2. As an authenticated Tailscale user (non-admin), make a request through the proxy: